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EVIDENCE-LIE DETECTOR TESTS-PRIOR
STIPULATION OF ADMISSIBILITY
The state appellate courts unanimously' and the federal courts 2 with but one
exception 8 have held lie-detector test results inadmissible as evidence in crimi-
nal trials. Usually the test results are rejected under the rationale set forth in
the leading case of Frye v. United States :4 the test "has not yet gained such
standing and scientific recognition" to justify its admission in the court room. 5
Where a prior stipulation has been executed, however, the decisions are not
unanimous; neither are they numerous. Two jurisdictions, California and Iowa,
have admitted the results in evidence. 6 Wisconsin and New Mexico have re-
jected them.7
In State v. Trimble,8 the defendant was charged with incest and voluntarily
submitted to a lie-detector test, stipulating in writing prior to the test that the
results could be admitted in evidence. At trial the results were admitted, but
1. State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933), Annot., 86 A.L.R. 616 (1933) ;
People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938), but see People v. Kenny, 167 Misc.
51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1938), decided a few months before the Forte case, allowing the
admission of the test results in evidence, and not expressly overruled by Forte. People v.
Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942), Annot., 134 A.L.R. 1174 (1942) ; State v.
Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945) ; State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147
(1947) ; Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949) ; State v. Pusch, 77 N.D.
860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950) ; Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951),
Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952) ; Kaminski v. State, 63 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1953) ; People v.
Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957). Cases collected in 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952).
In New Mexico, the admission in evidence of the testimony of the examiner as to the
operation of the machine has been held prejudicial error. State v. Varos, 69 N.M. 19, 363
P.2d 629 (1961). See also Leeks v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 326, 245 P.2d 764 (1952) ; People
v. Aragon, 154 Cal. App.2d 646, 316 P.2d 370 (2d Dist. 1957).
2. Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), Annot., 34 A.L.R. 147
(1925) ; Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Strom-
berg, 179 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). See United States ex rel. Sadowy v. Fay, 284
F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1960).
3. In Tyler v. United States, 193 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951), the statement of a witness
that he told the defendant that the lie-detector indicated the defendant was lying was
admitted as evidence bearing upon the question whether the defendant's confession
was voluntary.
4. 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923).
5. The device used in the Frye case to detect deception was a Marston "systolic blood
pressure test." For a description of this device, see Marston, Psychological Possibilities
in the Deception Tests, 11 J.Crim.L. 551 (1921).
6. California: People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App.2d 682, 193 P.2d 937 (4th Dist. 1948).
Iowa: State v. McNamara, 104 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa 1960). For an excellent comment on
the McNamara case, see 46 Iowa L. Rev. 651 (1961).
7. Wisconsin: Le Fevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943). New Mexico:
State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961).
8. 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961).
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over the objection of the defense counsel. The New Mexico Supreme Court
reversed on appeal. It held that even a signed waiver did not alter the Frye rule
excluding lie-detector test results.9
It is questionable whether the Frye rationale is, today, a valid reason to ex-
clude evidence obtained from a lie-detector test, 10 although there still seems
9. The court quoted, id., at 407, 362 P.2d at 789, from Frye v. United States, 293 Fed.
1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir. 1923),
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological author-
ities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from dis-
covery, development, and experiments thus far made,
and then held that "the signing of a waiver did not alter the [Frye] rule with regard
to the admissibility of ... [the lie-detector] evidence," 68 N.M. at 408, 362 P.2d at 789.
The court cited three cases in support of its holdings: Le Fevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416,
8 N.W.2d 288 (1943) ; Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Colbert
v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1957). However, the Le Fevre case should not
be authoritative when the examiner is present in court and testifies as to the results
of the lie-detector test. See note 20, infra. And the latter two cases are not in point on
the question of the admissibility of lie-detector tests results where there has been a
validly executed prior stipulation. In the Marks case there was no stipulation. In the
Colbert case, the defendant orally agreed in open court to take a lie-detector test and to
be bound by the result. The trial court admitted the results, but the court of appeals
reversed, holding that a sufficient foundation had not been laid. The court did not
approach the case as one involving a stipulation of "full admissibility," because "there
was no written stipulation, but only an oral agreement to take the test and be bound by
the results ... [the] agreement was not entered of record at the time it was made," 306
S.W.2d 827. Compare the civil case of Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172
(1951) where, during the trial, in the judge's chambers, and by direction of the judge,
opposing counsels agreed to have their clients take a lie-detector test, the results to be
used in evidence. The Michigan Supreme Court held the admission of the results in
evidence to be error.
10. Accuracy of the test: See Inbau & Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interroga-
tion, 110-12, 127 (3rd ed. 1955). This authority estimated the accuracy of the test, when
applied under favorable conditions, to be 95%, with a 4% margin of indefinite determina-
tions and a 1% margin of possible error. But see Levitt, Scientific Evaluation of the
"Lie-Detector," 40 Iowa L. Rev. 440, 450 (1955). Mr. Levitt says that Mr. Inbau's esti-
mations are "too optimistic" because they are "based primarily on the large number of
factors which can induce an erroneous interpretation of the polygraph record." Mr.
Levitt himself gives some of these factors in his article, pp. 451-56. See note 14 infra,
concerning these sources of error in interpretation.
Probative value: "Obviously the traditional explanation for exclusion of lie detector
results [ i.e. scientific recognition] is contrary to the accepted doctrine that all facts
having rational probative value are prima facie admissible, even though they tend only
to a 'slight degree' to prove an issue before the court. . . The sooner we recognize that
even though our experiences with the lie detector indicate a very high degree of accuracy
and probative value ... and that the only rational basis for excluding such evidence is
upon considerations of policy (perhaps a judicial fear of undue prejudice in the minds
of the jury resulting from a lack of proper administrative standards for controlling the
competency of the operator, the type of the machine used and the circumstances under
which it is used), the sooner we can identify the real difficulty and guide our efforts
toward setting up proper standards of control and permissible areas of evidentiary use-
fulness." Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 Vand. L. Rev.
385, 395-96 (1952).
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to be no "scientific recognition" of the test among scientists.11 Few opinions
expressly recognize what seem to be the serious dangers inherent in admitting
the test results, 12 namely, (1) the conclusive effect it may have upon the jury,'3
11. There are no adequate statistics showing that the validity of the test for lie
detection has "scientific recognition." But see Cureton, A Consensus as to the Validity
of Polygraph Procedures, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 728, 739-40 (1953), in which Mr. Cureton's
survey regarding uses of the polygraph shows, indirectly, that the validity of the test
for lie-detection is "recognized" by a substantial body of scientists (i.e., phychologists,
examiners, psychologist-examiners). McCormick, in his book on Evidence §§ 170, 174
(1954), says that there need be only a "substantial body of scientific opinion" accepting
the test, and citing Cureton, says there is this body of opinion:
General scientific acceptance is a proper condition upon the court's taking judicial
notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for admissibility of scientific evidence.
.... Frequently the opinions seem to demand a universality of scientific ap-
proval, which as pointed out above, has no basis in the standard applied to other
kinds of expert testimony in scientific matters. If we thus deflate the requirement
to the normal standard which simply demands that the theory or device be
accepted by a substantial body of scientific opinion, there can be little doubt that
the lie-detector technique meets this requirement.
However, Professor Inbau, in response to a question whether there was "general
acceptance" of the lie-detector test among today's scientists, answered the question in
the negative:
As regards the "general acceptance of the test among scientists" . First of all,
we would have to be specific about the meaning of the word "scientists." Even
if we limit it to psychologists and physiologists, I think you will find that a large
number of psychologists and psysiologists just do not know enough about the
technique and have not made sufficient inquiry to harbor an opinion. If by the word
scientists you mean police science specialists, I think here again you would find
that a considerable number of them would want to know who the polygraph
examiner is before expressing a willingness to accept his conclusions. Perhaps all
of this may add up to the fact that there is, at the present time, no general
acceptance of the results among scientists. (Letter from Fred E. Inbau, Professor
of Law, Northwestern University, to a staff member of the Natural Resources
Journal, December 5,1961.)
As long as no statistics or proof can be obtained showing a "substantial" body of scientific
opinion which accepts the test as an accurate and reliable detector of deception, the
courts will be able to exclude the test results on the grounds that no foundation was laid.
See e.g., State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945) ; People v. Forte, 279 N.Y.
204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949). See
Comment, 6 S.D.L. Rev. 136, 146 (1961), on the McNamara case, where the writer says
the test probably won't be accepted among scientists until the field of lie-detection be-
comes standardized (see note 14, infra).
12. In the cases in note 1, supra, the results were rejected primarily because there
was no foundation laid showing recognition among scientists of the accuracy or reliability
of the lie-detector. In some of the cases "escape" by the machine from cross examination
was an important reason for rejection.
Other reasons given to exclude the test results, but which have not carried much
weight with the majority of courts considering the issue are: (1) Due process: Silving,
Testing of the Unconscious Criminal Cases, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 683 (1956). For a criticism
of this theory, see Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence, 70 Yale L.J. 694
(1961). See United States ex rel. Sadowy v. Fay, 284 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1960) where
the court says that it is not a denial of due process to exclude lie-detector evidence. (2)
[VOL. 2
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and (2) the effect of an erroneous interpretation by an examiner. 14 Yet where
the parties understand these dangers, but nevertheless stipulate in writing to
the admissibility of the test, there is little to justify exclusion of the test.15 Parties
may agree to waive the rules of evidence and stipulate that a fact may be proved
Self-incrimination: See Silving, supra at 686; People v. Schiers, 160 Cal. App.2d 364,
329 P.2d 1 (1958) (dissenting opinion discussing thoroughly the issue of self-incrimina-
tion and citing authorities) ; but see Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and The Law
of Evidence, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 711, 718 (1953) ; Sell, Deception Detection and the Law,
11 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 210, 224 (1950). (3) Cross-examination: See State v. Lowry, 163 Kan.
262, 185 P.2d 147 (1947): "But the machine itself-conceding the comparatively high
percentage record as to accuracy and reliability claimed for it - escapes all cross
examination." Accord, Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949) ; Henderson
v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951). But see Sell, supra at 220. (4) Hearsay:
See United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; 33 Tul. L Rev. 880,
884 (1959). (5) Substitute for jury deliberation: See United States v. Stromberg, supra;
but see Wicker, supra at 724; 19 Ga. B.J. 90, 95 (1956). (6) One writer attacks the scien-
tific basis of the lie detector: "The theory of the detector contains two fundamental
assumptions: first, a regular relationship between lying and certain emotional states;
second, a regular relationship between these emotional states and changes in the body.
"The scientific basis for lie detection is questionable. There seems to be little evidence
that upholds the claim to a regular relationship between lying and emotion; there is
even less to support the conclusion that precise inferences can be drawn from the rela-
tionship between emotional change and psysiological response." Skolnick, Scientific
Theory and Scientific Evidence, 70 Yale L.J. 695, 700 (1960).
13. "If lie-detector results were admitted as legal evidence they would be offered
and treated of proof of some very important phase of the case, usually the validity of
the entire claim or contention of one of the parties. There would then be a tendency
on the part of many judges and juries to accord conclusive weight and significance to
the test results." Inbau & Reid, Lie Detection & Criminal Interrogation (3rd ed. 1955),
at 128.
14. An unqualified or biased examiner is probably the greatest danger attached
to use of the lie-detector in trials. An unqualified examiner cannot accurately diagnose
the factors that may affect the test results which are, inter alia: a subject's nervousness,
physiological abnormalities, mental abnormalities, unresponsiveness, and ability to "beat"
the machine. These factors are discussed by Inbau & Reid, supra note 13, at 64-99. Yet
even where the examiner is qualified, these factors may cause the results of a test to
be indefinite.
In addition, there are few qualified examiners in the field of lie-detection. "Although
there are 300-400 persons who regularly give polygraph tests and examinations, leading
professionals have admitted that not more than 10% are truly competent." Highleyman,
The Deceptive Certainty of the "Lie-Detector," 10 Hastings L.J. 47, 57 (1958). The
suggested and desired remedy for incompetent diagnosis is standardization in the field
of lie-detection, i.e., ". . . the formulation of adequate professional standards for poly-
graph experts and the promulgation of effective methods of enforcing these standards
by professional discipline, court rules or statutes." Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test
and the Law of Evidence, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 711, 727 (1953).
15. "There seems to be no substantial reason why an agreement and stipulation
to admit lie-detector tests in evidence should not be upheld. The final decision, however,
might well be left to the sound discretion of the trial court. If it should appear to the
trial judge, therefore, that the circumstances of a particular case did not warrant such a
procedure, or if he knew or had any reason to believe that the expert in the case was not
properly qualified, he would have the discretionary right to ignore the agreement and
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so long as the stipulation does not violate a rule of policy.16 The question of the
admissibility of lie-detector results over objection, where the defendant has
signed a "proper"' 17 stipulation, should be narrowed to whether possible pre-
judicial effect, or possible erroneous interpretation of the results are policy rea-
sons strong enough to exclude the test. It would seem, however, that even these
policy reasons should not override a stipulation where the defendant has been
advised by counsel and has stipulated that the examiner is an expert.' 8
stipulation and decline to accept the lie-detector evidence." Inbau & Reid, supra note
13, at 134.
See 1943 Wis. L. Rev. 430, 443; Harmon & Arthur, The Utilization of the Reid Poly-
graph, 2 Crim. L. Rev. 12, 16 (1955). But see Comment, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 651, 656 (1961)
on the recent case of State v. McNamara, 104 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa 1960), in which the
writer found it difficult to understand how the presence of a stipulation could cure the
defects of prejudice and unreliability, the grounds upon which the McNamara court
would probably have excluded the results in the absence of stipulation.
A stipulation cannot cure the defects of prejudice and unreliability, if the defendant
is not cognizant of them when he signs the stipulation. However, where the defendant
does recognize the effect that the introduction of the test results may have upon the
jury, and also possibility of erroneous results, but he still signs the stipulation with
advice of counsel, the policy reasons for excluding the test should not override the
defendant's gamble (see notes 18 and 30, infra).
The defendant, then, should be fully aware of the dangers of prejudice, and the
agreement should contain a stipulation that the examiner is an expert, that the test
is taken voluntarily, and that the results may be used in evidence. It should be signed
by the defendant, his counsel and the prosecuting attorney. For a suggested form of
agreement and stipulation, 'see Inbau & Reid, Lie Detection & Criminal Interrogation
(3rd ed. 1955), at 135.
16. 9 Wigmore, Evidence 2592, at 591 (3rd ed. 1940). The defendant may waive
a hearsay objection and his privilege against self-incrimination, as well as any objec-
tion he may have that no foundation was laid showing scientific recognition.
17. "Proper" is here used to mean that the defendant signed a waiver with knowledge
of the danger of prejudice and with belief that the examiner was competent.
18. Where a defendant and his counsel sign a stipulation, it should, perhaps, be
assumed that the defendant has been made aware of the danger of prejudice. Where
the parties stipulate that the examiner is an expert, this should not preclude the de-
fendant from attacking the examiner's credability, see note 30, infra, but it should be
sufficient to waive any objection by the defendant as to the witness's competency. But
even this assumption need not be made, since express statements of the defendant's
knowledge can and perhaps should be made a part of the stipulation.
The lie-detector has probative value, as shown by Cureton's survey of scientific
opinion, Cureton, A Consensus as to the Validity of Polygraph Procedures, 22 Tenn. L.
Rev. 728 (1953) ; and see Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory,
5 Vand. L. Rev. 385, 395-96 (1952). The reliability of the test is supported by prominent
experts in the field of lie-detection; its accuracy is supported by statistics. The defendant
is able to see the device in use; he can learn the scientific bases behind its performance.
The lie-detector is not a fortune teller's mystic ball, nor is a lie-detector examiner a
mind-reader purporting to have extra-sensory perception. Neither the-mystic ball, nor
the field of extra-sensory perception enjoy even a small percentage of the" scientific
acceptance" obtained by the lie-detector. Nor would the testimony of the fortune teller
or the mind reader be allowed in evidence to prove deception, or non-deception.
It is, of course, a question of degree as to just how much scientific recognition is required
before the court will even allow the testimony concerning the deception device. But from
[VOL. 2
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In two instances, the Trimble case and a Wisconsin case, Le Fevre v. State, 9
the test results were excluded even though there had been a prior written stipu-
lation. In the Le Fevre case, the results were held inadmissible because the
examiners were not in court to testify; only written reports were offered in
evidence.20 The court, in Le Fevre, cited an earlier Wisconsin case 2 1 to sup-
port its holding.22 There had been no prior stipulation in the earlier case, and
the results there were excluded under the Frye rationale. 23 In Trimble the de-
fendant was illiterate; he was not represented by counsel when he signed the
stipulation. Thus he had not been advised by counsel regarding the hazards
involved in admitting the test. Upon these facts it is understandable why the
court would not allow the admission of the results. 24 Both the Trimble and the
Le Fevre cases illustrate two situations in which the test results are justifiably
rejected despite the parties' prior stipulation of admissibility.25
The Trimble court, however, does not discuss the defendant's illiteracy and
what available authorities have written, it has been shown that the lie-detector is
sufficiently recognized to be admitted in evidence where the parties stipulate to its
admissibility.
19. 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943).
20. [A] polygraph test report was excluded although the state and the defendant
had stipulated that it could be used. However, the case seems to turn on the conception
that admitting the report without putting the examiner on the witness stand was probably
not within the contemplation of the parties to the stipulation and would violate the
hearsay evidence rule." Wicker, supra note 14, at 722, n. 55. See 1943 Wis L. Rev. 430,
436-37.
21. State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
22. The evidence was excluded in three sentences, with no reasons given other than
the citation of the Bohner case, supra note 21, as follows: "On the trial defendant offered
the report and findings of Professor Mathews; also the report and findings of Haney and
Keeler. On objection by the state, those parts of the reports containing the findings were
excluded and did not get before the jury. They were properly excluded. State v.
Bohner .... 242 Wis. at , 8 N.W.2d at 292 (1943).
One writer, however, believes the Le Fevre court would not have excluded the results
if the examiners would have been present at trial to testify. See Comment, 1943 Wis. L.
Rev. 430, 437-38, where the writer says: "It is difficult to believe that the court intended
to lay down the rule that the doctrine of the Bohner case will govern, even though the
parties enter into a stipulation before trial whereby they agree to admit the results of the
tests." See also the opinion in State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147, 149, 151 (1947),
from which it might be inferred that had there been a stipulation of admissibility the
test results would not have been excluded.
23. The Bohner case, supra notes 21, 22, was the first to follow the Frye case in deter-
mining the lie-detector's admission in evidence. The Keeler Polygraph, a more advanced
deception device than' that used in the Frye case, was used in the Bohner case.
24. If the procedures of taking the test are conducted so that the defendant may not
be aware of the dangers of prejudice and an inexpert examiner then the court, at its
discretion, should be able to exclude the results notwithstanding a prior agreement and
stipulation. See the quote from Inbau & Reid, supra note 15.
25. Yet neither court gave reasons for their exclusion of the evidence beyond citing
the Frye and Bohner cases. The appellate court precedents in the area of lie-detection
have been "one of the hurdles inhibiting judicial acceptance of polygraph tests."
Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 711, 725
(1953).
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lack of counsel, nor the bearing that those facts might have had upon its hold-
ing. The opinion is disturbing because it can be interpreted as laying down a
general rule that lie-detector test results won't be admitted in evidence under
any circumstances. 26 No mention is made of the California case, People v.
Houser,27 or the Iowa case, State v. McNamara, 28 where, in each case, lie-
detector test results were admitted by reason of prior stipulations. 29
Since the court did not mention any reasons for its holding other than the
Frye rationale, a reasonable inference is that in New Mexico, even if there
were a proper stipulation signed by the defendant, his counsel, and the prose-
cuting attorney, and a proper foundation laid, the court would not allow the
results in evidence.
If the court again has occasion to consider the admissibility of lie-detector
results based upon a prior stipulation of admissibility, it will probably be con-
fronted with the Houser and McNamara cases; it will then be necessary for
the court to make explicit its reasons for admitting, or excluding the results.
If the court admits the results in a future case in which the defendant has
waived his objection to admissibility, in order to mitigate the possibility of an
unjust result perhaps the court will allow the defense to attack the reliability
of the machine and the credibility of the examiner-witness, as well as entitle the
defendant to a cautionary instruction concerning the weight to be given the
lie-detector evidence. s0
Jonathan B. Sutin
26. The opinion in the case of State v. Perlin, 268 Wis. 529, 68 N.W.2d 32 (1955),
decided twenty-two years after State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 615, 246 N.W. 314 (1933)
(see notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text), has been criticized for the same reason,
i.e., that the court seems to lay down a rule barring the admissibility of lie-detector evi-
dence under any circumstances. See 19 Ga. B. J. 90-91 (1956). The Perlin court said this:
"Some argument is also made to the effect that the trial court improperly denied defend-
ant's request for a lie detector test. . . . In any event, results of such a test are not
evidence admissible upon trial." 268 Wis. at , 68 N.W.2d at 36 (1955).
27. 85 Cal. App.2d 682, 193 P.2d 937 (4th Dist. 1948), in which there was a prior
stipulation signed by defendant and his counsel, that the examiner was an expert operator
and interpretor and that the results could be admitted in evidence. The court, 193 P.2d
at 942, said: "It would be difficult to hold that the defendant should now be permitted
on this appeal to take advantage of any claim that such operator was not an expert and
that as to the results of the test such evidence was inadmissible, merely because it
happened to indicate that he was not telling the truth ......
28. 104 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa 1960), in which the defendant signed a stipulation
that she voluntarily submitted to the test and that the examiner could give his profes-
sional opinion as to the results of the test in court. The stipulation was signed by the
defendant, her counsel, and a deputy sheriff.
29. This may not at all be the court's fault. The briefs on appeal did not mention the
Houser or McNamara cases.
30. In a jurisdiction following the Houser and McNamara rules, a defendant who
signs a prior stipulation of admissibility merely takes an unnecessary gamble. If the
test results show that the defendant is truthful in denying his guilt, the prosecuting
attorney will probably dismiss the case. If the test results show that the defendant is
lying, however, he will be bound by his stipulation and must allow the results to follow
[VOL. 2
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him into the court room. Thus in a jurisdiction allowing evidence of lie-detector test
results upon stipulation it will be, in all probability, the rare case that a defendant would
sign a prior stipulation; for if he signs no stipulation, and is shown to be truthful in
denying his guilt, it is still likely that his case will be dismissed. On the other hand, if
the test shows deception, the defendant will be able to enter the court room without the
results of the test upon his back, with the hope of jury acquittal.
In that rare case, however, where a stipulation is signed prior to taking the test, the
defendant ought to be allowed certain precautions at trial to guard against possible
prejudices: (1) opportunity to extensively cross-examine the examiner concerning the
functioning of the machine( to show the jury that no bells ring, no lights blink) ; (2) an
instruction cautioning the jury not to give more weight to the examiner's testimony than
they ". . . shall find it to be entitled. [That they] may disregard any such opinion, if
[they] find it to be unreasonable." Cal. Jury Inst. (rev. ed. 1958), at 84. Further, although
the defendant stipulates that the examiner was competent as an expert in lie-detection,
and that the machine was in reliable working condition, perhaps the defense should still
be allowed to attack the credibility of the examiner (his competency in operating the
machine, i.e., the questionslused, his interpretation of results, his schooling, etc.), and the
reliability of the machine itself.
